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The Administration of Medicare:
A Neglected Issue
Thomas H. Stanton*
The administration of Medicare urgently needs attention. Although the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) currently pays claims
promptly, Medicare's administration is weakened by CMS's limited
capacity and flexibility, and especially by neglect of investment in its
people and systems. The growing gap between the agency's capacity and
its responsibilities contributes to a loss of stature, which in turn fosters
congressional micromanagement and further loss of capacity and
flexibility.
Disinvestment in Medicare's administration reflects similar neglect across
much of the federal government. Medicare's potentially powerful
constituency of beneficiaries, which has a stake in improved
administration, has been silent on this issue. Federal agencies and
programs generally would benefit from restoration of the capacity that
once existed in the Executive Office of the President to improve executive
branch organization and management.
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I. Introduction: Medicare and the Vending Machine
Model of Government
A review of the literature concerning Medicare reveals attention to
important issues like the funding of the program, proposed new areas of
coverage such as prescription drugs, the impact of demographics on the
program, and possible new ways to pay providers. With exceptions such as
reports by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and a recent study by a panel
of the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI), analysts and scholars
have not devoted the same level of attention to studying the administration of
Medicare and the implications of administration for the success of the
program.'
1. See generally STUDY PANEL ON MEDICARE'S GOVERNANCE AND MGMT., NAT'LAcAD.
OF SOC. INS., MATCHING PROBLEMS WITH SOLUTIONS: IMPROVING MEDICARE'S GOVERNANCE AND
MANAGEMENT (Kathleen M. King et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter STUDY PANEL]; see also
WILLIAM T. GORMLEY JR., MEDICARE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND STRUCTURAL REFORM: FINAL
REPORT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 1-21 (2000) (discussing various options and proposals for
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It is time to focus on the administration of Medicare. This Article
contends that Medicare's administration is both weak and in serious decline.2
Weak administration does not bode well for a program as large and complex as
Medicare, which seeks to pay almost $250 billion annually in claims for
medical services provided to about forty million beneficiaries.3 Weak
administration presents even more of a problem given the substantially
increased demands that the program will face as the baby boom generation
retires and becomes eligible for Medicare.
Many of Medicare's administrative shortcomings result from a significant
disparity between its responsibilities and resources, both in personnel and
dollars. At the inception of the Medicare program, providers expressed
apprehension about governmental intervention into health care.4 As a result,
the government created a different structure for administering Medicare than
for administering Social Security. The Social Security Administration (SSA),
with an in-house staff of 63,000,' processes Social Security payments directly
to over forty-five million beneficiaries according to a schedule of benefits that
is easy to administer.6 By contrast, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), formerly the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),7
currently has an in-house staff of fewer than 5,000. CMS, however, must
reorganizing the Medicare program). Also missing until recently was discussion of governance
issues relating to Medicare. That gap now has been filled by the NASI study and by an article
by Timothy Stoltzfus Jost. See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 39 (1999) (providing a thorough overview of Medicare governance).
2. See infra Part II (evaluating the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
administration of Medicare on the basis of four key factors: capacity, flexibility, accountability,
and life cycle).
3. Health Care Financing Administration's Role and Readiness in Medicare Reform:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 106th Cong. 43 (2000) [hereinafter HCFA Role and
Readiness] (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, Adm'r, Health Care Fin. Admin.
(HCFA)); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-101, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
AND PROGRAM RISKS: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 13 (2003) [hereinafter
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES], available at http://www.gao.gov/pas/2003/d03 101 .pdf.
4. See Neil Hollander & Bruce L. R. Smith, The Framework of Medicare
Administration, in THE ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICARE: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 1, 1-2
(Bruce L. R. Smith & Neil Hollander eds., 1973) (discussing the political accommodation in the
Medicare enabling act that required the government to refrain from interfering with the practice
of medicine).
5. ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 288 (2003).
6. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: A PRIMER 18-25 (200 1) (describing
Social Security's eligibility rules and benefits).
7. This Article uses the terms HCFA and CMS, depending on the context, to refer to the
same agency.
1375
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (2003)
administer a much more complex set of payments for Medicare services for
almost as many beneficiaries through numerous third parties that together
employ another 22,500 people
The gloomy assessment of the Medicare administration that this Article
presents, however, must be tempered with recognition of the positive points.
CMS regularly publishes its payment regulations on time and assures that about
a million providers are paid on time for the 900 million claims that they file
annually.9 This prompt payment is an impressive accomplishment, especially
for an agency as small as CMS. Unlike some troubled agencies, CMS
continues to have an unblemished record for the integrity of its officials. This
is a base on which the agency can improve the administration of Medicare.
Many of the problems besetting Medicare administration reflect the impact of
external forces rather than insurmountable problems within CMS.
The weakness in the administration of Medicare, and general inattention to
that weakness except at a fairly high level of analysis, is puzzling. The forces
that have weakened Medicare administration resemble those that also have
weakened other areas of government. Yet, in contrast to many other
government programs, Medicare benefits from the widespread support of an
influential and well-organized constituency of beneficiaries.'0 Medicare would
seem to be one part of government where the political process would demand
and achieve effective administration.
For Medicare, the need for effective administration is especially important
because of the pressures caused by increasing health care costs. Congress has
tightened limits on Medicare payments to the point that some providers are
8. Each of the federal agencies also administers other programs. SSA administers
Supplemental Security Income and black lung benefits. CMS administers Medicare, which
covers forty million people. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE
ENROLLMENT: NATIONAL TRENDS 1996-2001, at http://www.cms.gov/statistics/enrollment/
natltrends/hismi.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Medicaid helps to administer the State Children's Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP). See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID: A BRIEF SUMMARY, at
http://www.cms.gov/publications/overview-medicare-medicaid/ default4.asp (last visited Oct.
13, 2003) (describing SCHIP) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Medicaid
also regulates 175,000 laboratory entities that conduct laboratory testing, but not research,
performed on humans in the United States. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CLINICAL
LABORATORY IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS, at http://www.cms.gov/clia (last visited Oct. 13,
2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-817, MEDICARE MANAGEMENT: CMS FACES
CHALLENGES TO SUSTAIN PROGRESS AND ADDRESS WEAKNESSES 3 (2001) [hereinafter MEDICARE
MANAGEMENT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0817.pdf.
10. See Jost, supra note 1, at 96-97 (stating that Medicare has a wide range of
constituents that includes persons eligible for health care under the program); id. at 40
(describing Medicare's beneficiaries as "active participants in the political process").
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limiting or ending their participation in the program. As a result, the benefits of
an effective payments system could be immense. Malcolm Sparrow, a
healthcare fraud expert, estimates that the Medicare program is losing fifty to
seventy-five billion dollars annually to fraud." An improved payments system
that could detect fraud schemes early would help ease the financial pressure on
the program.
Part of the puzzle can be explained by the general inattention paid to
administration except by the most sophisticated interest groups.' 2 Political
scientist Donald Kettl suggests that many Americans, including congressional
policymakers, have a "vending machine" model of government-we place
money into a program and goods and services emerge.' 3 The vending machine
model leaves little room to consider the complexities of managing the people,
money, and systems needed to make a government program work.
Why have policymakers neglected the machinery of government? Those
experienced in the ways of Washington, D.C. give the expected answers:
(1) administration is not nearly as rewarding politically as the actual services
delivered to constituents; and (2) more money for administration means more
money for bureaucrats and the bureaucracy. 14 Those who adopt the vending
machine model tend to ignore important matters such as the differences among
programs and the need for careful attention to the resources, organization, and
management needed to keep the machinery operating well.
The Medicare program is structured, at least superficially, to embody the
vending machine model. Sallyanne Payton and others have pointed out that
beneficiaries pay little attention to administration because Medicare is required
11. See Reynolds Holding, Medicare Bilkedfor Billions in Bogus Claims, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 12, 2003, at Al (estimating the annual losses to the Medicare program resulting from fraud
(citing Malcolm Sparrow, Health Care Fraud Expert, Kennedy School of Gov't, Harvard
Univ.)), http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/01/12/MN63168.DTL
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 267-270 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (stating
that dominant interest groups are likely the only entities to have both the power and the
expertise to make meaningful changes to the administration of federal agencies).
13. See Donald F. Kettl, Managing Indirect Government, in THE TooLs OF GOVERNMENT:
A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 490, 494 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (discussing the
vending machine model of government services).
14. On the latter point, see Medicare Governance: Perspectives on the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (Formerly HCFA): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
107th Cong. 5 (2001) [hereinafter Medicare Governance] (prepared statement of Michael E.
Gluck, Research Assoc. Professor, Inst. for Health Care Research & Policy, Georgetown Univ.)
(describing how people often assume that expenditure of tax dollars on administrative agencies
only serves to support additional bureaucracy rather than supporting the provision of benefits to
the public).
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to pay virtually all claims within thirty days." As long as the program works
well enough to meet this basic demand, beneficiaries see little need to concern
themselves with the machinery that produces these results. Indeed, this
inattention can be seen as a triumph of Medicare administration: because CMS
routinely makes its benefit payments on time, beneficiaries have little incentive
to discover the complicated and deficient administrative systems that produce
those benefits.16 Only beneficiary advocacy groups, who have a stake in the
long run viability of the Medicare program, might have an interest in paying
attention to Medicare administration. But these groups also seem to have
largely neglected the issue. 17
This Article is organized as follows. Part II examines the administration
of Medicare from the perspective of the capacity, the flexibility, the
accountability, and the life cycle of CMS, the administering agency. Part m]
assesses the consequences of the decline in the quality of Medicare
administration. Part IV looks at the disinvestment that has weakened Medicare
administration and the administration of many government programs. Part V
makes recommendations for improving the administration of federal programs,
including Medicare. It then concludes that the beneficiary constituency of
15. See Sallyanne Payton, Professionalism as Third-Party Governance: The Function
and Dysfunction of Medicare, in MAKING GOVERNMENT MANAGEABLE (Thomas H. Stanton &
Benjamin Ginsburg eds., forthcoming Jan. 2004) (describing how the payment of medical
claims by Medicare is largely automatic and occurs with little interference by CMS, creating a
situation where providers have the incentive to maintain the status quo rather than advocating
changes to the current administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. Another possibility is that beneficiaries and their advocates can more easily interact
with state governments than with a federal agency. Thus, it seems that consumer advocates for
Medicaid, administered by CMS through the states, focus more on the program's inner workings
and implementation than do Medicare advocacy groups. See, e.g., NAT'L HEALTH LAW
PROGRAM, INC., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MAKING THE CONSUMERS' VOICE HEARD IN MEDICAID
MANAGED CARE: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE CONSUMER INVOLVEMENT 10-13 (1999) (discussing a
program where working groups from various states cooperated with a national organization to
develop recommendations to improve consumer involvement in Medicaid managed care).
17. CMS recently has taken steps to increase the involvement of the agency's constituent
groups, including beneficiaries, in the agency's internal processes. Administrator Tom Scully
formed twelve so-called "open door" groups of beneficiaries and health care providers,
including disabled beneficiaries, diversity beneficiaries, hospitals, and health plans. About half
of these groups are chaired by the administrator or deputy administrator of CMS. Participants
may attend the group sessions, which are conducted roughly every two months in person or
through a toll free phone number. The purpose of the sessions is to bring participants into direct
contact with the CMS officials who can answer their questions. Judging from two sessions
monitored by the author, most of the participants' questions appear to address immediate
concerns such as coverage or claims rather than higher-level administrative issues. CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OPEN DOOR INITIATIVE, at http://www.cms.gov/opendoor (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Medicare is a valuable potential source of support for improvements in the
administration of the program. More generally, improvements in the
administration of government programs will require a restoration of capacity in
the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to provide guidance and support
for those improvements. Both beneficiary groups and policymakers will benefit
from looking beyond the vending machine model to address the major issues of
administration that confront many government programs today.
I. Inside the Vending Machine: The Administration of Medicare
Four criteria can help to evaluate the administrative ability of CMS to
administer the Medicare program:' 8 (1) Capacity: What is the capacity of
CMS, in terms of people, administrative budget, systems, and needed
organization to administer the Medicare program; (2) Flexibility: What
flexibility does CMS have, under the law and in practice, to administer the
program; (3) Accountability: How is CMS held accountable for its
administration of Medicare; and (4) Life Cycle: As the agency matures, what
strengths and shortcomings manifest themselves?
Application of these four criteria to the administration of Medicare reveals
that, although CMS is currently paying claims promptly, the agency has
shortcomings in capacity, flexibility, and forms of accountability. In addition,
the emergence of serious life cycle issues means that attention to administrative
issues is of great importance in order to ensure the quality of the agency's
performance in the future. Consider each of the four criteria in turn.
A. Capacity
The capacity of Medicare administration is seriously constrained by
limitations on resources. Resource limitations result in inadequate staffing,
systems, and funding. The inadequate staffing of CMS is striking. In 2002,
18. In an article by Thomas H. Stanton, the author applies similar criteria to federal credit
programs. See Thomas H. Stanton, Federal Credit Programs: The Economic Consequences of
Institutional Choices, THE FINANCIER: ANALYSES OF CAPITAL AND MONEY MARKET
TRANSACTIONS, Feb. 1994, at 20, 23-26 (evaluating the ability of federal agencies to provide
credit on the basis of their accountability, flexibility, and capacity); see also Thomas H. Stanton,
Assessing Institutional Development: The Legal Framework that Shapes Public Institutions,
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION: EVALUATING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS: NEW APPROACHES FOR A NEW AGENDA, Fall 1995, at 55, 59-63 (comparing and
evaluating government agencies, private entities that serve public purposes, and ordinary private
companies using the criteria of performance, accountability, capacity, and life cycle).
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CMS had only 4,497 full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees.' 9 This number is
less than the 4,961 FTE employees the agency had in 198020 when the
workload and number of beneficiaries were much lower.
Tight staff ceilings are a special problem for an agency such as CMS that
needs to keep up with developments in healthcare and technology. One
consequence of the agency's limited ability to hire is that CMS has a graying
workforce. 2 In February 2000, the HCFA Administrator testified that over
one-third of the agency's employees would be eligible to retire in the following
five years,22 depriving the agency of a potentially large number of workers with
valuable institutional memory.23
Funding constraints for Medicare's administration are severe. Figure 1 on
page 9 shows the dramatic decline in Medicare administrative expenses as a
percent of benefit payments from 1970 to 1999.24 In 1999, a group of fourteen
prominent healthcare policy experts from across the political spectrum signed
an open letter calling for Congress and the administration to address the "crisis
facing HCFA and millions of Americans. '25 The letter stated that limited
resources and lack of administrative flexibility threatened to cripple the
administration of Medicare:
19. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:
FISCAL YEAR 2004, at app. 423 (2003) (listing the total number of full-time equivalent
employees at CMS).
20. See Memorandum from Sibyl Tilson, Specialist in Social Legislation, Domestic Social
Policy Division, Congressional Research Service, to the Senate Finance Committee attachment
V (Jan. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Memorandum] (listing information on the HCFA's organization
and staffing, extracted from the appendices of the Budget of the United States government from
fiscal years 1977 to 2000) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See NAT'L ACAD. OF PuB. ADMIN., AN AGENCY AT RISK: AN EVALUATION OF HUMAN
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AT HCFA 50-56 (1991) [hereinafter AN AGENCY AT RISK]
(discussing the age distribution and retirement eligibility projections of the current HCFA staff
and how the average age of HCFA employees has increased in recent years).
22. See Medicare: The Need for Reform: Hearing before the House Comm. on the
Budget, 107th Cong. 54 (2001) (prepared statement of William J. Scanlon, Dir. of Health Care
Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office) (describing the testimony of the HCFA Administrator on
the personnel turnover within the Agency).
23. MEDICARE MANAGEMENT, supra note 9, at 23 (discussing the impact of the retirement
of a large number of experienced HCFA personnel on the Agency's human capital).
24. See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEDICARE 2000: 35 YEARS OF IMPROVING
AMERICANS' HEALTH AND SECURITY 43 fig.22 (2000) [hereinafter MEDICARE 2000] (depicting
the decline in Medicare's administrative costs as a percentage of total spending on the program
from 1970 to 1999).
25. See Stuart M. Butler et al., Crisis Facing HCFA & Millions ofAmericans, HEALTH
AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 8, 9 (requesting cooperation between the legislative and executive
branches to fix problems with the HCFA).
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The mismatch between the agency's administrative capacity and its
political mandate has grown enormously over the 1990s. As the number of
beneficiaries, claims, and participating provider organizations; quality and
utilization review; and oversight responsibilities have increased
geometrically, HCFA has been downsized.
Calls for increased administrative resources also have come from the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)27 and the Study Panel on
Medicare's Governance and Management of NASI.
28
Figure 1
Medicare Administrative Expenses as a Percent of
Benefit Payments, Fiscal Years 1970-1999
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Source: HCFA/Office of Strategic Planning: Data.from Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
Note: Data Are Reported for Community-Dwelling Beneficiaries Only.
26. Id. at9.
27. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: REDUCING
MEDICARE COMPLEXITY AND REGULATORY BURDEN 22 (2001) (recommending that Congress
provide resources for CMS to thoroughly test regulations before their implementation, and
calling for Congress to appropriate the necessary funds for CMS to purchase new technology
that would simplify the agency's administrative processes while simultaneously improving the
exchange of information between Medicare participants).
28. See STUDY PANEL, supra note 1, at 8 (stating the panel's finding that CMS's resources
are insufficient to support its growing administrative responsibilities).
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When the SSA administered Medicare, the program's administrative
budget was significantly higher than it is today. At that time, the administrative
budget amounted to 3.1% of the total program for Part A (care in hospitals and
other institutional settings), and 11% for part B (physician, other professional,
and specified services and supplies). 29 However, by 1999, those numbers
decreased to 1.5% and 1.9%, respectively.30 By contrast, private sector
administrative costs of insurance companies, for example, can range from 12%
and higher.31 A private insurer, however, would have some costs, such as
marketing, underwriting, taxes, and the need to make a profit, which CMS does
not incur. But the point remains that CMS's administrative expenses are
seriously under-funded.
Although technology is changing the nature of the work required for
Medicare administration, CMS often has been unable to keep up with these
changes. The agency is limited in the systems that it can acquire or modernize.
Some of the critical CMS information systems are decades old and rely on
operating software that is rarely used by any entity other than CMS.32 In
addition, many of these systems are incompatible with one another.33
Major contributors to the problem are the lack of adequate resources for
administration of the Medicare program and the lack of a multiyear
commitment for the funding that is needed for any major acquisition. As the
29. See MEDICARE 2000, supra note 24, at 43 fig.22 (showing Medicare's administrative
costs as a percentage of total spending in 1970).
30. See id. (showing Medicare's administrative costs as a percentage of total spending in
1999).
31. See Medicare: 21st Century Challenges Prompt Fresh Thinking About Program's
Administrative Structure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 106th Cong. 4 n.4 (2000)
(prepared statement of William J. Scanlon, Dir. of Health Fin. & Public Health Issues, Health,
Educ. & Human Servs. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office) (stating that the HCFA
Administrator testified that the Agency spends less than 1% of benefit outlays on program
management, compared with private health insurers that spend 12% or more of their budgets on
administration); see also Health Care Financing Administration's Role and Readiness in
Medicare Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 106th Cong. 5 (2000) (statement of
Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, Adm'r, Health Care Fin. Admin.) (stating that the HCFA's
administrative budget is approximately 1.5%, lower than any insurance company in the private
sector).
32. See Medicare Reform: Modernization Requires Comprehensive Program View:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th
Cong. 13 (2001) (statement of William J. Scanlon, Dir. of Health Care Issues, U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office) (discussing the inadequacy of many of HCFA's vital information systems).
33. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-824, MEDICARE: INFORMATION SYSTEMS
MODERNIZATION NEEDS STRONGER MANAGEMENT AND SUPPORT 2 (2001) [hereinafter
INFORMATION SYSTEMS] (describing problems with CMS's information systems), available at
http://www.gao.gov.
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GAO reported, "CMS' IT [information technology] projects compete for
resources with other agency responsibilities of national importance, some of
which are also lacking in funds and staff."34 The GAO calls the allocation of
funds for IT in this environment "a difficult juggling act. 35 Allocating funds
for a financial management system meant that CMS had to decrease or
eliminate funding for other systems, including a centralized national provider
enrollment database and a contractor-monitoring database.3 6 The third-party
administration of Medicare is another part of the problem. CMS administers its
claims payment process through a myriad of contractors that operate divergent
systems. This variation greatly complicates the design of any common system.
Perhaps most importantly, the agency has been unable to develop the
capacity needed to modernize its claims payment systems. HCFA failed at its
effort in the 1990s to create a single modem claims processing system. 37 Any
long-term effort to improve the claims payment systems will require a multiyear
commitment of funds plus a well-conceived technology plan backed by the in-
house expertise needed for implementation. As the GAO testified:
Owing to a failed attempt in the 1990s to modernize Medicare's multiple
information systems, HCFA's current systems remain seriously outmoded.
Without effective systems, the agency is not well positioned to collect and
analyze data regarding beneficiaries' use of services-information that is
essential to managing the program effectively and safeguarding program
payments.
38
The absence of such monitoring systems results in the agency lacking the
ability to manage its core programs effectively. In addition, fraud and abuse
activities can drain resources from the Medicare program more easily if the
agency does not have the proper systems in place.39 The CMS information
systems can take months to respond to a query before generating information
about the services that beneficiaries receive and the payments made to
34. Id. at 18.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Brian Friel, Medicare Transactions, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, Apr. 2000, at 68,68-70
(discussing HCFA's failed attempt to replace its outdated information system with a large
integrated system that would handle all of the agency's problems).
38. Medicare Fraud, Waste, andAbuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health
& Human Servs. & Educ. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 25 (2000) (prepared
statement of Leslie G. Aronovitz, Assoc. Dir. of Health Fin. & Pub. Health Issues, Health,
Educ., & Human Servs. Div., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office).
39. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL: How FRAUD BLEEDS AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 62-68 (2000) (describing CMS's current claims processing system and
how such a system is largely inadequate for detecting and preventing Medicare fraud).
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providers. 40 The absence of proper information technology systems means that
too much of the Medicare claims payment process is left to law enforcement
after fraud and abuse actually are detected. Both providers and beneficiaries
have a stake in improved CMS IT systems that will reduce the pressure for
fraud and abuse enforcement.
41
Tight resource constraints also result in CMS lacking the ability to
increase the level of payments for Medicare contractors to process claims,
engage in program safeguard activities, and otherwise play a major role in
administering the program.42 Nancy-Ann Min DeParle testified that when she
led the agency, HCFA reduced the cost to process a Medicare claim to about
one dollar as a means of stretching the contractor budget.4 '3  To reduce
processing costs and shift to electronic claims, the agency again engaged in a
juggling act. To accommodate increased spending in areas such as beneficiary
education and outreach, HCFA permitted its contractors to reduce other
services.
For example, HCFA eliminated the toll-free lines that physicians used to
call carriers with questions about Medicare billing." It then reinstated these
lines, presumably because of complaints from providers who find Medicare
billing rules to be too complicated and difficult to understand. 45  The
reinstatement of these lines on a shoestring budget, however, was not enough to
40. See INFORMATION SYSTEMS, supra note 33, at 7 (stating that the structure of several of
CMS's key databases prevents the easy retrieval of beneficiary information).
41. See Thomas H. Stanton, Fraud-and-Abuse Enforcement in Medicare: Finding the
Middle Ground, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 28, 33-35 (describing how the improvement
of HCFA's information systems would vastly improve the agency's ability to detect and prevent
fraud, thereby benefiting Medicare's constituents).
42. See Memorandum, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that the number of HCFA claims
processing contractor full-time-equivalent-employees (FTEs), a proxy of the number of staff
members working in the department, fell from 28,051 in fiscal year 1992 to 22,200 in fiscal year
1998).
43. Patients First: A 21st Century Promise to Ensure Quality and Affordable Health
Coverage: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 249 (2001)
[hereinafter Patients First] (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, former Adm'r,
Health Care Fin. Admin.); see also Memorandum, supra note 20, attachment IV (listing HCFA
budget justification data on contractor claims processing costs, in current and 1988 constant
dollars, for the years 1997 through 2001, when Nancy-Ann Min DeParle was the administrator
of the agency).
44. See Patients First, supra note 43, at 249 (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann Min
DeParle, former Adm'r, Health Care Fin. Admin.) ("We even eliminated the toll-free lines that
physicians used to call carriers with questions about Medicare billing in order to accommodate
increased spending on other areas, including beneficiary education and outreach.").
45. Id.
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do the job. In 2001, the GAO reported that it had tested the carrier provider
inquiry lines and found them seriously wanting.4 The GAO placed about sixty
calls to the provider inquiry lines of five different carriers and asked three test
questions taken from the "frequently asked questions" page on the carriers' own
web sites.47 The GAO found that only 15% of the carrier responses were
complete and accurate while 53% were incomplete and 32% were entirely
incorrect.4s The GAO found that scarce CMS resources and understaffing
contributed to the problem.49 Undoubtedly, given the outcry that followed the
disclosure of the GAO results, CMS will induce the carriers to improve their
provider communications. The only question remaining is which important
administrative activities the agency must curtail to accommodate the new
priority.
Payment of hundreds of billions of dollars of claims annually is a major
challenge, which is compounded by the frequent modifications needed to deal
with annual updates in fee schedules, new policies, and changes in the law. In
2000, Medicare's claims contractors, the carriers and fiscal intermediaries that
pay claims on behalf of CMS, received over 700 change orders.50 These orders
required changes in the way that payments are calculated or paid.5
Lack of adequate capacity also means that CMS cannot meet the
congressional demands for new regulations and notices, which are needed to
implement new laws that adjust the Medicare program. In 2001, Nancy-Ann
Min DeParle testified that since 1996, Congress had enacted five major pieces
46. See Medicare: Improvements Needed in Provider Communications and Contracting
Procedures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. 4 (2001) (statement of Leslie G. Aronovitz, Dir., Health Care, Program
Admin. & Integrity Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office) (describing problems with carrier
provider inquiry lines). Aronovitz stated:
We found that carriers' bulletins and Web sites did not contain clear or timely
enough information to solely rely on those sources. Further, the responses to phone
inquiries by carrier customer service representatives were often inaccurate,
inconsistent with other information they received, or not sufficiently instructive to
properly bill the program.
Id.
47. See id. at 5 (describing the GAO method for assessing the accuracy of information
provided by carrier inquiry lines).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 6 (discussing how a lack of administrative resources and personnel
contribute to shortcomings in CMS's provider communications).
50. See INwORMATION SYSTEMS, supra note 33, at 6 (stating that recent Medicare
legislation caused the agency to implement many system changes).
51. See id. (stating that changes in legislation required Medicare contractors to
substantially modify their methods for processing claims).
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of legislation that required HCFA to implement over 700 provisions for Medicare
and other programs. 2 The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) alone contained "some 335
provisions requiring changes, in some cases major changes, to virtually every aspect
of the Medicare program, as well as substantial changes in Medicaid." 3 HCFA
published thirty-nine regulations and seventy-one notices to implement the BBA,
but this was insufficient to implement the law completely.54 As Timothy Jost points
out, the issuance of regulations by CMS has been prodigious, but insufficient.55
Some rulemaking proceedings have taken over a decade. The immense regulatory
workload that results from the structure of the Medicare program, repeated
congressional enactments that require yet further regulations for implementation,
and resistance from powerful constituent groups all contribute to cause the delay.
56
People who follow the Medicare program closely paint a bleak picture of the
consequences of CMS's incapacity. They describe management of Medicare today
as management by crisis. 57 To deal with the most pressing problems of the moment,
CMS must cannibalize people and resources from other activities. No continuity in
projects and no long-run plan for improvement exist. CMS sacrifices other
priorities to meet short-term demands. This sacrifice results in gaps in information
and performance. Even though the core mission of the agency revolves around
making proper payments to providers, the agency is unable to link patient-level data
across sites of care or easily aggregate information about the adequacy of the
payments that providers receive for Medicare services.
52. Patients First, supra note 43, at 247 (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann Min DeParle,
former Adm'r, Health Care Fin. Admin.).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 248 (stating that despite publishing a large number of notices and
regulations, the HCFA lacked the staff to fulfill all of the requirements of the BBA).
55. See Jost, supra note 1, at 89 (asserting that although the HCFA has issued a huge
number of rules governing the Medicare program, its efforts satisfied neither the agency's own
regulatory goals nor the program's needs).
56. See id. at 89-91 (describing the lengthy delay in many HCFA rulemaking proceedings
and citing several reasons for such delay).
57. Interviews with unnamed present and former HCFA and CMS officials (Oct. 31,2002
& July 10, 2003); see also Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Ways & Means, 2003 WL 21667336 (statement of David M. Walker,
Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office) (describing Medicare as a "high-risk program"
because it is "highly vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement); Government
Efficiency, Financial Management: Use of Management Tools in Formulating the Budget:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov 't Reform, 2003 WL 1559001 (statement of Patricia
A. Dalton, Dir., Strategic Issues) (describing Medicare as a "high-risk" program); Medicare:
The Need for Reform: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Budget, 107th Cong. 50 (2001)
(statement of William J. Scanlon, Dir., Health Care Issues) (stating that Medicare management
needs to be improved to meet "current 21st century needs and expectations").
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The constraints on resources for Medicare may reflect not only the general
disinvestment of government, discussed in Part IV below, but also concerns about
the possible consequences of strong and capable Medicare administration. For
example, Sallyanne Payton suggests that:
In the great American political debate Medicare has a unique place because it is
an age-delimited piece of a universal national health insurance program, the rest
of which might be created in an appropriate political moment .... Actions
affecting Medicare tend to be evaluated politically, therefore, for their potential
to advance or retard the cause of national health insurance, for their effect in
creating or tending to block the creation of an administrative infrastructure
sufficient to allow the government to make a credible claim that it can
administer a national health insurance system, and for their potential to push
future development toward one model or another of government-sponsored
health coverage.58
Indeed, some policy makers cite the shortcomings of Medicare administration as
reasons to consider moving to other models of healthcare delivery, such as the
management of private plans in a system comparable to the Federal Employees
Health Benefit System. The basic structure of the Medicare program and the role of
CMS in administering Medicare now are matters for open political discussion. In
summary, CMS lacks the capacity at multiple levels-including administrative,
budget, staffing, and systems--to carry out its work properly. The vending machine
may be functioning, but not with the correspondence between resources and
functions that was apparent in earlier years and that is needed today.
B. Flexibility
The administration of Medicare is constrained by a number of inflexibilities.
Major inflexibilities relate to managing the activities of the contractors and other
third parties that carry out the administration of Medicare. Figure 2, below, sets
forth the major functions of Medicare, including the setting of prices for fee-for-
service Medicare services, claims processing and payment, and overseeing the
quality of institutional care. 9
In all of these activities, CMS relies heavily on third parties. The setting of
prices for fee-for-service physician services, for example, depends on the Current
Procedure Terminology (CPT) codes that the American Medical Association
58. Sallyanne Payton, Third-Party Governance and the Dysfunction of Medicare 5 (June
25, 2001) (unpublished conference paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See MEDICARE MANAGEMENT, supra note 9, at 4-5 (detailing CMS's responsibilities
in managing the Medicare program).
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establishes and updates. 60 The most important of Medicare's administrative
functions is the setting of prices annually and the payment of claims. CMS does not
pay claims directly. Instead, CMS depends on numerous Medicare fiscal
intermediaries and carriers as claims administration contractors, which together
employ thousands of people.6' These contractors help CMS administer the
Medicare program, including the processing of claims for hospitals and providers.
In addition, CMS contracts with other firms to provide so-called program safeguard
services, including monitoring to detect fraud and abuse.62 By contrast, CMS has
fewer than 5,000 in-house staffmembers to manage not only the Medicare program,
but also Medicaid and other healthcare programs.63
Heavy reliance on third parties causes significant inflexibility in the
administration of Medicare. Besides being limited by the disparity in size between
its inhouse staff and the size of the claims administration contractors, CMS also is
limited administratively by the terms of its relationship with them. Under the law,
provider associations, rather than CMS, nominate fiscal intermediaries."' The
providers have selected Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans and the National Blue
Cross/Blue Shield Association as contractors. 5 Carriers must be insurance
companies. 66  Although the Medicare law does not specifically exempt these
contracts from provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the
provider nomination provisions of the law "have always been understood as
necessarily overriding the usual government contract requirements for competitive
bidding."
67
60. See Bruce Vladeck, The Political Economy of Medicare, HEALTH Arr., Jan./Feb.
1999, at 22, 28 (stating that the American Medical Association holds the copyright on the basic
coding terminology needed for Medicare's system of paying physicians and that the Association
controls many of the technical aspects of that payment system).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8 (describing how CMS, relying on a small
staff, must process claims for a large number of beneficiaries through carriers and intermediaries
that themselves have a substantial total number of employees).
62. MEDICARE MANAGEMENT, supra note 9, at 12-13.
63. See supra text accompanying note 19 (stating that in 2002 CMS had only 4,497 full-
time equivalent employees).
64. See EDWARD STEINHOUSE, NAT'L AcAD. OF SOC. INS., GOvERNMENT CONTRACTING IN
THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 4 (2001) (stating that the "most unusual feature" of the fiscal
intermediary contract is that the contractor is chosen by the provider, not by the government)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-918T, MEDICARE CONTRACTING
REFORM: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN CONTRACTING FOR CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION
SERVICES 3 (2001) [hereinafter MEDICARE CONTRACTING REFORM] (describing the process by
which contractors and carriers are chosen), available at http://www.gao.gov.
66. STEINHOUSE, supra note 64, at 7.
67. Id. at4.
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Figure 2
Examples of CMS's Responsibilities in Managing Selected
Medicare Program Activities
/ Setting prices
In accordance with legislatively prescribed guidelines, CMS sets tens of thousands of
fees or prices to pay suppliers for Medicare-covered items and to pay providers-
including physicians, hospitals, rehabilitation and nursing facilities, and home health
agencies-for Medicare-covered services. For example, CMS must
" develop rates for physicians that reflect the resources involved in providing
individual services as well as variations in their costs across local markets and
" set rates for acute care hospitals reflecting services beneficiaries will need based
on diagnoses and adjust payments to reflect geographic cost differences.
Overseeing fee-for-service claims administration
In monitoring about 50 Medicare claims administration contractors, CMS must
determine whether the contractors, among other things,
" meet performance standards for timeliness and accuracy of claims processing;
" identify insurers that should have paid claims that were mistakenly billed to
Medicare;
" operate fraud units that explore leads and develop and refer cases to law
enforcement agencies;
* identify and investigate instances or patterns of inappropriate billing that could
result in unnecessary payments and serious financial losses to the program; and
" collect overpayments.
/ Educating beneficiaries
CMS is responsible for improving beneficiary understanding of the Medicare program.
To do this, CMS has launched a national education campaign, Medicare & You, to
provide Medicare beneficiaries with information about Medicare and their health plan
choices. Information is made available to beneficiaries through a variety of channels,
including print materials mailed to all beneficiaries, toll-free telephone service, and an
Internet site.
V Ensuring that institutional care meets Medicare requirements
To help ensure that Medicare beneficiaries receive quality care, CMS
" contracts with state agencies to survey institutional providers, such as SNFs
[Skilled Nursing Facilities], home health agencies, and dialysis facilities, and
certify that they meet Medicare's conditions of participation and associated
standards;
* conducts training activities to help ensure that state surveyors are qualified to
enforce the federal quality standards for care; and
" is required, for certain providers, such as hospitals, to accept accreditation by the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care Organizations or other
accrediting bodies.68
68. See, e.g., JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS. (JCAHO), WHAT
IS THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS [hereinafter
JCAHO], at http://www.jcaho.org/ general+public /who+jc/index.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2003) (describing the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations' mission
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V Overseeing Medicare+Choice
CMS contracts with managed care plans, requiring, among other things, that they
" provide basic benefits to enrollees;
" comply with applicable provider requirements, including those relating to
certification and participation; and
" operate quality assessment and performance improvement programs.
CMS must
" review for accuracy the promotional literature and membership materials that
each plan distributes to beneficiaries; and
" ensure that plans have adequately informed beneficiaries of their right to appeal
adverse coverage or payment decisions.
69
In addition to being awarded without full and open competition, the
contracts also must cover the entire range of claims processing and related
activities, with exceptions such as work that has been delegated to the program
safeguard contractors. The contracts cannot be terminated without cause and
without providing the contractor with an opportunity for a public hearing.70
The contracts may not provide performance incentives and must be cost-based
rather than performance-based. 7' CMS also must rely on many other third
parties to administer its programs. These programs include state agencies
needed to oversee institutional providers, such as skilled nursing facilities,
home health agencies, and dialysis facilities, and to certify that they meet
Medicare's standards. Likewise, these third parties include certain providers,
such as hospitals, that must attain accreditation by the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations or other accrediting bodies. 72
For CMS, these third parties create a number of inflexibilities. First, the
use of contractors creates a bureaucratic division between CMS and the
contractors that provide the services. This bureaucratic division costs CMS
information about the program it must administer and also removes significant
management flexibility. The carriers and fiscal intermediaries, in addition to
the people that work for them, have connections with members of Congress.
Among other consequences, when carriers or fiscal intermediaries consolidate,
CMS comes under pressure to assure that the employees of the merged
to provide accreditations to health care organizations) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
69. See MEDICARE MANAGEMENT, supra note 9, at 4-5 (detailing CMS's responsibilities
in managing the Medicare program).
70. See MEDICARE CONTRACTING REFORM, supra note 65, at 3 (stating that Medicare
contractors cannot be terminated without a public hearing under the Social Security Act).
71. STUDY PANEL, supra note I, at 45.
72. See, e.g., JCAHO, supra note 68 (describing JCAHO).
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institutions are protected, even if efficiency might be achieved through closure
of some facilities.
Second, the bureaucratic divisions among contractors create inflexibility.
Contractors use divergent payment systems to pay claims to the providers that
they serve. 3 CMS has worked assiduously over the years to reduce the number
of payment systems that contractors use to pay Medicare claims and has
succeeded in reducing the number. Lack of uniformity of payment systems
creates difficulty for CMS in trying to link claims either to providers or to
beneficiaries across the United States. The results in terms of the creation of
openings for fraud and abuse can be imagined, but are harder to quantify. The
results in terms of frustration of providers, including many companies that
serve multiple states, are more directly palpable.
The problem of bureaucratic division also arises in other contexts. For
example, the new program safeguard contractors, created pursuant to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996, have assumed
many of the functions of trying to assure that payments for claims are proper,
including audits and investigation for possible fraud. 74 Many of these functions
are supposed to be taken over from the claims administration contractors. One
can imagine, in a system hungry for resources, that the transfer of these
functions and the needed cooperation of the existing claims administration
contractors with the new program safeguard contractors will not always take
place smoothly.
A third inflexibility derives from the fact that CMS is limited to the terms
of its contracts with each contractor. Without adequate funds or authority to
create incentives for good performance, CMS lacks the ability to create good
performance, especially among the claims administration contractors. The
extent to which the system of contractors actually has become dysfunctional is
surprising. Numerous outside reviews have found that the contractors may fail
to check provider claims properly to prevent payment errors.
75
One predominant reason for this substandard performance relates back to
the capacity of Medicare administration and the limited resources that the
73. See INFORMATION SYSTEMS, supra note 33, at 3-4 (describing Medicare's multiple,
contractor-operated claims processing systems).
74. See MEDICARE MANAGEMENT, supra note 9, at 12-13 (describing how these efforts
will help safeguard Medicare money by identifying when other companies should pay claims
instead of Medicare).
75. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-115, MEDICARE
CONTRACTORS: DESPITE ITS EFFORTS, HCFA CANNOT ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS OR
INTEGRITY 24 (1999) [hereinafter MEDICARE CONTRACTORS] (finding that HCFA rarely checks
contractors' self-certifications to ensure their validity), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive
/1999/he99115.pdf.
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government has dedicated to pay for processing claims. It would cost a carrier
or fiscal intermediary much more to create and operate a system for paying each
claim for the appropriate amount than merely to pay each claim promptly.
Carriers and intermediaries have no incentive to audit or investigate
questionable claims. As with other financial services where a federal program
is subject to excessive parsimony, the government tends not to get more than
the quality of service that it paid for. Moreover, as noted above, the law limits
CMS to cost-based reimbursement contracts.76 These constraints, coupled with
nearly flat payments to contractors, have resulted in a shrinking pool of
available companies. Since 1980, the number of Medicare contractors has
dropped by half, indicating that these companies do not find Medicare business
as attractive as in the past.
77
Another major area of inflexibility for Medicare administration concerns
the limitations on CMS's ability to hire, promote, and terminate employees.
The agency also is limited in its ability to contract for services. In addition, it is
restricted in its ability to adjust its administrative budget in response to changes
in demand for Medicare services. These inflexibilities affect many agencies
across government. However, the consequences are more pronounced for a
major program such as Medicare that serves forty million beneficiaries.78
CMS would benefit from various forms of personnel flexibility that
Congress has granted to other agencies.7 9 These areas include the creation of
excepted service positions so that CMS could hire a limited number of people
with specialized skills in medicine, information technology, or finance at levels
of compensation somewhat greater than the usual civil service limits. CMS
also would benefit from the creation of a program of term appointments,
allowing the agency to hire people for terms of up to five years. This flexibility
could infuse the agency with people that have fresh skills and perspectives, who
might not be ready to sign up for a full civil service career.80 CMS also needs
some basic flexibility in the personnel area. Currently, CMS has only fifty-four
76. See MEDICARE CONTRACTING REFORM, supra note 65, at 3 (stating that the Social
Security Act calls for the use of cost-based reimbursement contracts).
77. STUDY PANEL, supra note 1, at 45.
78. HCFA Role and Readiness, supra note 3, at 43 (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann
Min DeParle); MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, supra note 3, at 13.
79. See, e.g., HAL G. RAINEY, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS ENDOWMENT FOR THE Bus. OF
Gov'T, A WEAPON IN THE WAR FOR TALENT: USING SPECIAL AUTHORITIES TO RECRUIT CRUCIAL
PERSONNEL 33-34 (2001) (evaluating the success of government agencies that were granted
flexibility in personnel recruitment), available at http://www.endowment.pwcglobal.com/
pdfs/Rainey Report.pdf.
80. STUDY PANEL, supra note 1, at 57.
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Senior Executive Service (SES) positions, ten of which are noncareer.8 1 The
GAO has testified that this is a far lower allocation of SES positions than
Congress has provided for other agencies with significantly smaller budgets and
less onerous responsibilities.8 2
The shortcomings in CMS's authority to contract for carriers and fiscal
intermediaries have already been noted. 3 Numerous commentators, including
GAO officials and former HCFA administrators Nancy-Ann Min DeParle and
Bruce Vladeck, have called for modernization of the statutory requirements
relating to carriers and fiscal intermediaries.8 4 Needed changes include:
(1) subjecting these contractors to competition so that low performers have an
incentive to improve; (2) expanding the types of firms that are eligible to
compete; and (3) removing a statutory provision that requires these contractors
to be paid on a cost-basis and that prohibits them from making a profit.
85
Both houses of Congress passed legislation in the 108th Congress to
improve the relationship between CMS and its contractors and to permit
competition among claims administration contractors.86 Competition would be
a great step forward, but it should not be assumed that it would be a panacea.
The contracting process will be cumbersome and slow. Consider, for example,
TRICARE, the military health system administered by the Department of
Defense that provides health benefits to over eight million active duty
personnel, their dependents, and retirees.87 A GAO review of the TRICARE
health coverage program found numerous shortcomings." TRICARE is muchsmaller than Medicare in the number of beneficiaries it serves and it uses
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra Part II.B (discussing flexibility as one of Medicare's shortcomings).
84. See Patients First, supra note 43, at 250-51 (recommending that legislation should be
adopted which would "broaden the pool of qualified private sector entities to do the job [process
claims, interact with hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers], permit incentive
based contracts, and allow consolidation to achieve economies of scale"); BRUCE C. VLADECK &
BARBARA S. COOPER, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., REPORT No. 1627, MAKING
MEDICARE BETrER 15 (2001) (arguing for modernizing statutory requirements concerning
Medicare's relationships with its fiscal intermediaries and carriers).
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (arguing for modernization of statutory
requirements).
86. See Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1, 108th Cong.
§ 911 (2003) (providing for increased flexibility in Medicare administration); Prescription Drug
and Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, S. 1,108th Cong. § 521 (2003) (same).
87. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-742T, DEFENSE HEALTH CARE: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM TRICARE CoNTRACTS AND IMPLICATIONS FORTHE FUTURE 1 (2001) [hereinafter
DEFENSE HEALTH CARE], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dOI742t.pdf.
88. See generally id. (describing shortcomings with TRICARE's contracting approach).
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competition to select its health care contractors. 9 The GAO reported that a
single contract proposal consisted of 33,000 pages, and one contractor official
stated that the company proposal cost about five million dollars to bid.90
Because of the costs to prepare a proposal, bid protests were common.91 The
contracts are large, complex, and prescriptive in nature.9 The need for
numerous change orders (that is, required changes in work, compared to what
was specified in the original contract agreement) has made costs difficult to
predict and has created funding shortfalls. 93 Finally, once again for CMS, the
issue of resources will be paramount. In good part, the strength of the CMS
relationship with its contractors will depend on the resources that the agency is
permitted to devote to paying contractors for good work and to assuring their
performance.
The current relationship of CMS with its carriers and fiscal intermediaries
is symptomatic of the general inflexibility of the Medicare program. The law
provides that "any willing provider" that is properly certified may provide
Medicare services and receive payment. 94 This reflects a culture of Medicare
that resists changes to permit greater flexibility in the delivery of Medicare
services. While a panel of NASI proposed that the management of Medicare
should include more innovation and pilot programs, efforts such as the
demonstration programs to bring price competition to Medicare+Choice plans
have foundered because of constituency concerns.95 As the GAO has
concluded in a different context, "Medicare's particular dilemma is that the
number of special interests affected and the dollars involved make it difficult
89. Compare the eight million people eligible for care through TRICARE with the forty
million elderly and disabled people enrolled in Medicare. Id. at 1.
90. Id. at 5.
91. See id. (describing how losing contractors claim they have everything to gain by
protesting the award to another bidder even at substantial cost).
92. See id. at 5-6 (describing the contracts).
93. See id. at 7-8 (discussing how Department of Defense TRICARE contract adjustments
and change orders have forced the Department to request additional funding from Congress).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(a) (2000) (providing for "[b]asic freedom of choice" for
Medicare beneficiaries).
95. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., FROM A GENERATION BEHIND TO A GENERATION AHEAD:
TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL MEDICARE 23 (1998) (recommending that HCFA innovate
Medicare by adapting private health care practices to its own needs and experimenting with new
ways of managing services), available at http://www.nasi.org/usr-doc/med-report-gen_
behind.pdf; Len M. Nichols & Robert D. Reischauer, Who Really Wants Price Competition in
Medicare Managed Care?, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 30, 33 (reporting on two
competitive bidding demonstration projects which were opposed because of beneficiary fears of
loss of benefits and provider fears of loss of profits).
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even to test on a limited basis the prudent purchasing techniques employed by
the private sector." 96
Finally, CMS is subject to budget inflexibility that has limited the
agency's ability to make the investments in staffing, systems, and contractor
payments that are needed to keep up with its burgeoning workload.97 The
Medicare budget is divided between mandatory dollars to pay for services and
discretionary funds to pay for administration.98 This means, as Robert
Berenson and Dean Harris point out, that investments in increased program
effectiveness would involve increased spending on program administration
while the savings would accrue to the Medicare trust funds.99 One option for
overcoming this problem, albeit not without its own defects, would be to set the
administrative budget for Medicare according to a formula related to the
program's payments for services.1°° Another option would be to create a
special administrative fund similar to the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control
(HCFAC) account that funds fraud and abuse activities of CMS and other
agencies.101 As a part of the reporting requirements of the law, the agencies
submit an annual report that includes a discussion of the activities for which
funds have been expended and the monetary results of activities.'02 This latter
96. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-HEHS-00-108, MEDICARE: 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGES PROMPT FRESH THINKING ABOUT PROGRAM'S ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 5
(2000) [hereinafter FRESH THIIKUNG], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he
00108t.pdf.
97. See Robert A. Berenson & Dean M. Harris, Using Managed Care Tools in
Traditional Medicare-Should We? Could We?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at
139, 146 (describing the division of the Medicare budget and stating that this division presents a
major barrier to adopting cost-cutting techniques).
98. See id. ("A major barrier to adopting managed care cost-cutting techniques is the
division of the Medicare budget between mandatory dollars to pay for services and discretionary
dollars to pay for administration.").
99. See id. (stating that "[a]dopting virtually any managed care technique would involve
increased spending on program administration, yet savings would accrue to the trust funds").
100. See Medicare Governance, supra note 14, at 51 (prepared statement of Michael E.
Gluck, Research Assoc. Professor, Inst. for Health Care Research & Policy, Georgetown Univ.)
(discussing the possible benefits of an option of setting Medicare's administrative budget
according to a formula related to benefit payments).
101. See generally DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANN. REP. FOR FY 2002 (2003).
102. HIPAA, also known as the Kennedy-Kassebaum Act, was landmark legislation that
had a strong impact on the government's efforts to address fraud and abuse. Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. The law,
among its many other provisions, authorized the Medicare Integrity Program and a dedicated
fund for fraud and abuse activities. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd (2000). HIPAA guaranteed funding
from the Medicare Part A Trust Fund, through the HCFAC Account. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)
(2000).
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option would preserve accountability to Congress while allowing CMS
increased flexibility to make investments in improved Medicare
administration. 03
C. Accountability
CMS is accountable for its administration of Medicare both to higher
levels of the Executive Branch and to Congress. Congress enforces
accountability through the power of the purse, the power to hold hearings, and
the power to change the law that authorizes both CMS and the Medicare
program. In the case of CMS, congressional accountability has turned into
congressional micromanagement. As described earlier, Congress regularly
changes the details of the Medicare program.104 Former HCFA Administrator
Bruce Vladeck points out that many of these changes are enacted at the behest
of narrow interests.10 5 He points to statutory provisions that skew prospective
payment systems towards particular classes of providers, which also include
express preferences for particular hospitals. 0 6 Under these circumstances, he
sees the prospective payment system as losing much of its simplicity and
rationality to become more like the Internal Revenue Code. 0 7 In 2000, the
HCFA Administrator, Nancy-Ann Min DeParle, testified that:
In the two and a half years that I have been Administrator, HCFA has been
the subject of more than 1100 audits and oversight reviews by the General
Accounting Office and HHS [Health and Human Services] Inspector
103. Senate Bill 1895, introduced in the 106th Congress by Senators John Breaux (D-La.)
and Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), would require CMS to submit an annual business plan to Congress,
which, until 2008, would be subject to an up-or-down vote. S. 1895, 106th Cong. (1999). After
that, CMS could implement its business plan without express congressional approval. See
FRESH TANKING, supra note 96, at II (explaining how the Breaux-Frist Medicare reform
proposal would seek to improve HCFA's management capacity). The annual business plan
would allow CMS to propose changes in provider payment rates, contracting provisions, and
purchasing strategies. Id. CMS no longer would be subject to the annual appropriations
process and instead would include those expenses in the premium that it proposed in its
business plan. Id.
104. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (describing congressional action
requiring changes to Medicare).
105. See Vladeck, supra note 60, at 27 (relating how various groups work to protect and
advance their own narrowly focused interests through the political process).
106. See id. (describing various statutory provisions that are targeted towards certain
hospitals or groups of hospitals).
107. See id. ("With every passing year, the prospective payment system (PPS), which was
touted by some of its initiators as a model of uniform, 'scientific' national policy, looks less like
theoretical exercise in health economics and more like the Internal Revenue Code.").
1396
THE ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICARE
General. We receive, on average, more than 700 letters a month from
members of Congress, and our contractors receive thousands more.'°8
In addition, congressional committees and subcommittees hold large numbers
of oversight hearings with respect to CMS and Medicare.
CMS also is held accountable for the actions of third parties that help to
administer the Medicare program. As Lester Salamon and others have pointed
out, the use of third parties to deliver public services creates management
challenges and can complicate the lines of accountability. 09 This complication
can be seen most clearly in the case of the contractors that pay Medicare claims.
Indeed, several of CMS's claims administration contractors committed fraud
against the program." 0 A 1999 GAO report summarizes the problem:
Since 1990, nearly one in four claims administration contractors has been
alleged-generally by whistle-blowers within the company-to have
integrity problems; GAO identified at least 7 of HCFA's current 58
contractors as being actively investigated by the HHS OIG [Office of
Inspector General] or Justice. Since 1993, HCFA has received criminal
and civil settlement decrees totaling over $235 million from six contractors
after investigations of allegations that the contractor employees deleted
claims from the processing system, manufactured documentation to allow
processing of claims that otherwise would have been rejected because the
services were not medically necessary, and deactivated automatic checks
that would have halted the processing of questionable claims.II
Moreover, the strong constituencies that surround the Medicare program
also impede CMS's ability to manage the program in an accountable manner.
Timothy Jost points out that providers have impeded CMS's ability to issue
regulations to implement laws." 2  Providers also have registered strong
objections to CMS's efforts to improve the collection of information, for
example with respect to documentation of provider claims. 3 CMS seems to be
108. HCFA Role and Readiness, supra note 3, at 48 (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann
Min DeParle).
109. See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 37-38
(2002) (discussing the manageability and accountability challenges of third parties delivering
government services).
110. MEDICARE CONTRACTORS, supra note 75, at 4.
111. Id. at 4-5.
112. See Jost, supra note 1, at 90 (attributing some of the delay in HCFA issuing rules to
the fact that the rules are controversial and are met with large amounts of comments and with
intense lobbying by certain medical providers).
113. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-1014T, MEDICARE MANAGEMENT:
CMS FACES CHALLENGES IN SAFEGUARDING PAYMENTS WHILE ADDRESSING PROVIDER NEEDS 4-
5 (2001) [hereinafter SAFEGUARDING PAYMENTS] (documenting several provider complaints and
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caught in a bind-it is held accountable for administrative shortcomings, but
often lacks the political backing or the tools to hold third parties or program
participants accountable. Sometimes the missing tools involve statutory
limitations as well as lack of political backing, such as when Medicare pays
higher prices for medical products than other payors. 114 Other times, such as
when CMS relies on states to conduct surveys of quality of care of nursing
homes, home health agencies, and kidney dialysis facilities, CMS is held
accountable for shortcomings in state performance." 5
The atmosphere has turned negative for CMS. 116 Indeed, one of the
reasons the agency changed its name was to try to diminish some of the
opprobrium that was perceived to attach to HCFA." 7 Much of the criticism of
CMS has been misdirected and should be directed instead at the nature of the
Medicare program, with its complexities, constantly changing statutory
prescriptions, and a political context that prevents CMS from adopting useful
efficiencies that would be available to a private sector company in a similar
business. One may fear that the discrediting of CMS has reached such
proportions that Congress is in danger of allowing CMS to become the
ineffective agency that some vocal constituents so often deride. The agency
must be held accountable, but the current relationship with Congress is not the
way to assure good performance. Not only beneficiaries, but also members of
concerns in the light of CMS expansion of safeguard and enforcement activities), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01 !014t.pdf.
114. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-1 01, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
AND PROGRAM RISKS: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 9-12 (2003) [hereinafter
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES] (explaining how Medicare's approach to payment of medical
services and equipment cannot accommodate changes in the market, how CMS's complicated
regulatory processes make it difficult for the agency to take prompt action, and how the
agency's attempts to use streamlined price adjustment processes have received criticism),
available at http://www.gao.gov/pas/2003/d0310l.pdf.
115. See id. at 33-38 (observing deficiencies in state surveys of nursing homes, home
health agencies, and kidney dialysis centers, and indicating that CMS is responsible for
overseeing the adequacy of state surveys).
116. Thus, a postmortem on one failed Medicare+Choice pricing experiment concluded:
"Don't let HCFA be your face on the Hill .... [T]he credibility of HCFA staff is low and will
have to be restored before the Medicare policy-making process can improve." Nichols &
Reischauer, supra note 95, at 41.
117. See Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services, The New Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) (June 14, 2001) ("Changing the agency's name is the
first, visible sign of the many steps being taken to change the agency and drive it to be [sic.]
responsive and effective agency that it should be .... [M]uch of the criticism of the agency has
focused on the length of time it takes to get a response from the agency. CMS is making
responsiveness to beneficiaries, providers, plans, states, and other stakeholders a focus of the
agency."), at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/200106l4a.html (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Congress, may be ignoring the needs of good administration because they have
adopted the vending machine model of how Medicare should operate.
D. Life Cycle
Three types of life cycle issues can complicate the effectiveness of an
administrative agency. The first relates to design flaws that were built into
program administration at the inception of an agency or program. The second
relates to the institutional culture that results from an agency's history. The
third relates to changes in an agency's staffing and systems as the agency
matures.
Similar to many other agencies and programs of the federal government,'
CMS and Medicare are limited administratively by political compromises made
at the start of the program. While the reliance on so many third parties, each
with its own constituency and influence, makes the administration of Medicare
a daunting task, the costs of third-party governance were foreseen at the
inception of Medicare and were understood to be the price for obtaining
provider support for the new program." 9  Sylvia Law cites a 1962
memorandum of a task force of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (now HHS) that highlights the tradeoff, in this case with respect to the
use of Blue Cross in program administration:
A considerable price would be paid in order to get the initial public
relations advantages with professional groups that might come from using
Blue Cross, e.g., loss of direct contact with providers so that the Federal
Government would not have detailed knowledge of problems and because
of this, the loss of ability to react quickly to problems of administration,
budget, program, etc.'
20
The second life-cycle issue relates to the origins of an institution's culture.
The pressures in 1965 to start the Medicare program and to prepare to process
118. See generally AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS
AND NSC (1999); Murray Comarow, The Future of the Postal Service, in MAKING GOVERNMENT
MANAGEABLE: EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE 21 ST CENTURY (Thomas H.
Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg eds., forthcoming Jan. 2004) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
119. See generally STEINHOUSE, supra note 64, at 3-7 (discussing the role of intermediaries
in the administration of Medicare and discussing problems associated with the use of those
intermediaries).
120. SYLVIA A. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG 34 (2d ed. 1976) (quoting HEW
memorandum from Arthur E. Hess, Chairman, Sub-taskforce on Use of Blue Cross and Other
Insurers, to Wilbur J. Cohen, Under Sec'y of the Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare I (May 10,
1962)).
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the claims of nineteen million people eligible for the program within one year
had the effect of emphasizing ability to pay claims quickly rather than assuring
that claims were paid correctly:
The basic driving force behind all of the early efforts in establishing the
Medicare system was to pay bills. Congress, the presidency, SSA, and its
contractors all feared the political reverberations, the public frustration, and
the disillusionment that would set in if the system fell apart because of the
complexities of processing and paying claims .... [A]s a result of the
major concern to achieve operational readiness quickly, little attention was
paid in the first few years to the problems of cost control .... 121
At its inception, administration of Medicare was assigned to the SSA. 22 CMS
(then called HCFA) was not created until 1977.'23 The administration of
Medicare by the SSA also affected the outlook of the people responsible for
Medicare-they saw their function as the prompt payment of Medicare claims,
comparable to the agency's obligation to make prompt payment of Social
Security benefits. 1
2 4
Unfortunately, the analogue between administration of Medicare and
Social Security is misplaced. Social Security uses a large in-house staff to
make payments directly to beneficiaries. By contrast, Medicare relies on third
parties who pay the claims of yet other third parties, such as doctors, hospitals,
and skilled nursing facilities for Medicare services. These third parties have
interests that may not coincide with those of the government or of
beneficiaries. 125 This conflict of interest, along with the annual changes in
Medicare coverage and payment levels, requires the agency that administers
Medicare to take on the responsibilities of a regulatory agency to assure not
only that Medicare claims are paid promptly, but also that they are paid in the
appropriate amount.
121. Hollander & Smith, supra note 4, at 7.
122. Jost, supra note 1, at 86.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 86-87 (describing the psychology of the Social Security officials who
originally implemented the Medicare program and suggesting that this mentality continues to
affect the administration of the Medicare program).
125. Sallyanne Payton points out how the professionalism of some provider groups may
reduce the problem of dissonance between those providers and beneficiaries. See Payton, supra
note 15, at 7-11, 21-24 (discussing the tension between third-party payers, physicians, and
beneficiaries and explaining how the use of professional standards to determine appropriate care
may reconcile a provider's professional responsibilities and a patient's needs for individualized
care).
1400
THE ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICARE
Even after the transfer of Medicare to the new HCFA, federal officials
seemed reluctant to take on the role of a regulatory agency. As a former HHS
General Counsel wrote:
Put simply, HCFA has viewed itself as a check-writing agency whose
missions are to determine when people can receive money for doing
something and then to pay that money when they do it. Historically, it has
not viewed itself as a regulatory agency and has resisted legislative efforts
to transform it into one. 16
This pattern changed only in the 1980s, with enactment in 1983 of the
Prospective Payment System for hospitals and the enactment in 1989 of the
Medicare Fee Schedule for physician payments. 127 As Jonathon Oberlander
observes, these enactments were "regulatory revolutions" for Medicare:
Cost containment became the administrative hallmark of HCFA, which saw
itself in terms of health financing and purchasing of medical services.
Fiscal pressures were the driving force behind Medicare reform, and in
contrast to SSA's mission as protectors of social insurance, Congress
looked upon HCFA to protect the federal budget.
28
Only in the 1990s did the agency begin to address the problem of fraud
and abuse in a serious way. Moreover (and this may reflect resource
constraints as well as the difficult political context for effective action), the
agency seemed unable to issue many of the regulations needed to implement
legislation that Congress enacted. The most recent GAO report on Medicare as
a high-risk program lists one program area after another where the agency has
neglected to promulgate regulations that the GAO believes are appropriate for
proper implementation of the Medicare program.129 Indeed, Michael Astrue,
the former HHS General Counsel, contends that at least some congressional
enactments have come about because of exasperation in Congress about
Medicare administration and a feeling that enacting a new law is the best way
126. Michael J. Astrue, Health Care Reform and the Constitutional Limits on Private
Accreditation as an Alternative to Direct Government Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1994, at 75, 75.
127. See JONATHAN OBERLANDER, NAT'L ACAD. ON SOC. INS. STUDY PANEL ON MEDICARE
GOVERNANCE & MGMT., AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF MEDICARE 22 (2001) (describing
HCFA's changes to Medicare policy, including the Prospective Payment system for hospitals
and the Medicare Fee Schedule for physicians) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
128. Id. at 24.
129. See generally MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, supra note 3.
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to assure that the program is implemented in a way that reflects congressional
intent. 30
The third life-cycle issue involves changes in the strength of a maturing
agency. The decline in resources for administration of Medicare and tight
limits on the size of the CMS workforce already have been noted.' 3' Workforce
limitations mean that an agency's personnel tend to get older as personnel
constraints prevent the hiring of younger cohorts.132 The agency faces staff
shortages, both in terms of skills and numbers,' 33 and the shortages will be
exacerbated as older staff retire. As noted earlier, CMS now is facing the
prospect that roughly one-third of its workforce will be eligible to retire in the
next five years. 34 Many of the successors who will be recruited or promoted to
replace the retirees are unlikely to possess either the institutional knowledge or
the skills needed to administer the program well.'
35
In summary, an evaluation of the capacity, flexibility, accountability, and
life cycle of CMS reveals an agency that is losing its ability to administer the
Medicare program. While the vending machine metaphor may characterize the
general perspective of policymakers and Medicare beneficiaries, the actual
administration of Medicare--once Congress has placed the money into the
system and specified the types of outputs that it desires in any particular year-
reveals the shortcomings of the perceived model. Unseen by policymakers and
beneficiaries, the innards of the administrative system are losing their strength.
130. See Astrue, supra note 126, at 76 (describing HCFA's reluctance to view itself as a
regulatory agency and describing congressional efforts to change this view and to encourage
HCFA regulatory responsibility by enacting statutes that indirectly regulate medical providers).
Astrue also points to the reluctance of HCFA to accept responsibility for policing fraud and
abuse as leading to the unique characteristics and responsibilities of the HHS Office of Inspector
General. See id. (attributing the broad responsibilities of this office to the HCFA's resistance of
additional regulatory responsibility).
131. See supra Part II.A (discussing the limits on CMS's capacity to administer the
Medicare program in terms of people, administrative budget, systems, and organization).
132. See, e.g., AN AGENCY AT RISK, supra note 21, at xiv (stating that although the quality
of senior staff is high, HCFA lacks enough high-quality mid-level staff to replace the current
senior staff); supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (discussing Medicare resource
constraints that result in inadequate staffing).
133. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-1006T, MEDICARE: SUCCESSFuL REFORM
REQuiRES MEETING KEY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 9 (200 1), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d0 I11006t.pdf.
134. See MEDICARE MANAGEMENT, supra note 9, at 23 (reporting that CMS has estimated
that about 35% of its workforce will be eligible to retire over the next five years).
135. See id. (stating that the upcoming retirements of CMS employees heightens concerns
raised about the agency's loss of technical and managerial expertise); INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
supra note 33, at 21 ("CMS also faces the possibility of losing its current employees who have
technical and managerial expertise.").
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III. The Decline of Medicare Administration: Does it Matter?
In the vending world, when a particular machine becomes old, decrepit, or
obsolete, the vending company will replace it with a shiny new one. By
contrast, CMS and Medicare have been subject to a relentless combination of
external pressures and increasing demands that have left CMS without much of
its original ability to administer the program. 136 What are the consequences of
this weakening of Medicare administration?
On the one hand, one should recognize that, for all of the challenges it
faces, CMS has done a remarkable job of holding together the administration of
Medicare. Medicare covers about forty million elderly and disabled
beneficiaries and pays on a timely basis $210 billion in claims to about 700,000
physicians, 6,000 hospitals, and thousands of other providers and suppliers.
3 7
For the large majority of beneficiaries, Medicare provides healthcare on a fee-
for-service basis.'38 CMS contracts with about fifty carriers and fiscal
intermediaries, essentially insurance companies, to process almost one billion
fee-for-service claims a year.139 Medicare provides coverage to the remaining
beneficiaries who are enrolled in 346 private managed care plans, where a
single monthly payment covers needed services.
140
On the other hand, timely payment is not the same as proper payment of
Medicare claims. Rising healthcare costs are calling the future nature of the
program into question.' 41 If Malcolm Sparrow is only partially right in his
estimate of a fifty to seventy-five billion dollar annual loss due to Medicare
fraud, 142 the improvement of CMS's ability to detect and prevent much of that
fraud would make a major contribution to restoring confidence in the program,
especially in the fee-for-service part of Medicare.
136. See infra Part IV (suggesting that Medicare and CMS are not alone in this plight).
137. HCFA Role and Readiness, supra note 3, at 43 (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann
Min DeParle); MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, supra note 3, at 13.
138. Medicare: 21st Century Challenges Prompt Fresh Thinking About Program's
Administrative Structure, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 106th Cong. 2 (2000)
(statement of William J. Scanlon, Dir., Health Fin. & Pub. Health Issues, Health, Educ., &
Hum. Servs. Div.).
139. HCFA Role and Readiness, supra note 3, at 43 (prepared statement of Nancy-Ann
Min DeParle).
140. Id.
141. See MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that Medicare spending
growth has brought congressional attention to the need for reform).
142. See Holding, supra note 11, at A l (discussing the estimated losses to the Medicare
program resulting from fraud).
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Moreover, providers have a stake in improved administration. First, a
number of providers have threatened to leave the Medicare program because of
increasing pressure on the level of fees that the programs pays, especially for
physician services. 143  A reduction in payments for fraudulent claims can
increase the resources available to pay legitimate claims. This is especially true
because of the relative value scales that Medicare uses to pay claims-to the
extent that fraudulent claims may be concentrated in certain specialty areas,
providers in other areas of practice will be disadvantaged.
Second, weak payment systems mean that too much of the process of
dealing with improper claims is left to law enforcement rather than the claims
systems themselves.' 44 Improved payment systems might help reduce the
administrative burdens on responsible providers that today are being subjected
to increasing paperwork requirements in an effort to detect improper claims and
that currently feel threatened by the prospect of litigation under the False
Claims Act. 45 Third, the absence of timely and accurate information about the
Medicare program undermines CMS's credibility. For example, when CMS is
unable to provide reliable and timely information about providers' transaction
costs-for example, for pharmaceutical drugs and medical products covered
under Medicare-and beneficiaries' use of Medicare services, CMS finds it
difficult to defend its position that payments for such services might be
reduced. 46  Finally, a weakening of administrative capability can cause
unexpected trouble. This has happened to government agencies from time to
time. 147 The immense scale of the Medicare program, and the lack of depth in a
143. See Robert Pear, Medicare Fees for Physicians in Line for Cuts, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 12,
2003, at A l (discussing physician reaction to expected cuts in Medicare payments to health care
providers).
144. See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back:
A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REv. 239, 277-
80 (1999) (discussing fraud and abuse enforcement as a substitute for inadequate federal
auditing of claims payments).
145. See Thomas H. Stanton, Medicare Fraud and Abuse Enforcement in Medicare:
Finding Middle Ground, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 28, 33 (suggesting that effective
administration of the claims payment process would help reduce payment of inappropriate
claims).
146. MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, supra note 3, at 12 (stating that CMS has difficulty
defending its position to adjust payments downward when analyses of data on providers'
transaction costs and beneficiaries' use of Medicare services are unreliable).
147. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, At NASA, Concerns on Contractors, WASH. POST, Feb.
17, 2003, at A I (discussing concerns expressed over the privatization of NASA operations
which may have compromised agency oversight of safety and quality control in light of the
February 1, 2003 space shuttle tragedy); James Glanz, Bureaucrats Stifled Spirit ofAdventure,
NASA Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at Al (discussing how NASA's reliance on
outside contractors has contributed to the weakened technical and scientific ability of its
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system stretched for administrative resources, mean that unforeseen problems
could materialize that might cause difficulty to a large number of beneficiaries
and providers.
When one balances the benefits and costs of improving the quality of
Medicare administration, depriving CMS of the resources that it needs has not
been cost effective. CMS has been deprived of needed resources in its budget,
staffing, and systems 148 CMS also needs other support as well, including
political support for improvements in program design that could reduce the
costs of the program. For policymakers who adhere to the vending machine
model, the lesson is clear-unless the machine is refurbished, it cannot
continue to carry out the increased number and variety of transactions that
consumers will require from the Medicare program.
149
IV. External Forces and the General Decline of Government Institutions
and Programs: An Emerging Crisis-The Disinvestment of Government
Medicare and CMS are not the only government programs and agencies
with administrative capabilities that policymakers have neglected. Starting in
the 1970s and accelerating in the 1980s, many domestic agencies found
themselves seriously constrained in available resources to administer their
programs. In 1988, Comptroller General Charles A. Bowsher delivered the
Webb lecture to the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) in
which he warned of an emerging crisis, what he called the "disinvestment of
government."150
employees).
148. GAO reports, for example, call for increased funding to pay for improved program
administration in a number of areas. One report points to actions by Congress to increase
funding through the Medicare Integrity Program, and states:
While Medicare would be likely to benefit from additional efforts to identify
overpayments, further efforts may require increased funding. As it has sought to
run the program economically, HCFA has been left with fewer and fewer dollars to
pay for administering a program that has grown in volume and whose management
involves increasingly complex tasks.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-304, MEDICARE: HCFA COULD Do
MORE TO IDENTIFY AND COLLECT OVERPAYMENTS 19 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov.
149. The NASI Study Panel on Medicare's Governance and Management called not only
for an increase in administrative capacity and flexibility, but also for Congress to stop making
major program changes so that the agency could catch up with its current workload. See STUDY
PANEL, supra note I, at 70-73 (recommending that Congress provide CMS with more resources
and flexibility to contract with new organizations and urging Congress not to enact major
changes in the program because CMS lacks the resources to implement those changes).
150. See generally Charles A. Bowsher, An Emerging Crisis: The Disinvestment of
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By the 1990s the crisis foretold by Bowsher began to emerge. Budget and
staff cuts have turned many agencies into hollow organizations.'' The United
States Commission on National Security/21 st Century looked at the activities of
agencies relating to homeland security and found that the Department of State
was "starved for resources."'5 Moreover, "[t]he Customs Service, the Border
Patrol, and the Coast Guard are all on the verge of being overwhelmed by the
mismatch between their growing duties and their mostly static resources.'
53
The Commission reported that the problem of hollow government was
widespread and not merely confined to the domestic side of government:
As it enters the 21 st century, the United States finds itself on the brink of an
unprecedented crisis in competence in government .... Both civilian and
military institutions face growing challenges.., in recruiting and retaining
America's most promising talent54
Once an agency finds itself hampered for resources to carry out its
mission, a downward spiral can begin. Members of Congress, especially under
circumstances of divided government, begin to perceive that an agency is not
carrying out the law in the manner that they wish. The experience of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is instructive in this
regard. 55 A NAPA panel reported, "Problems at HUD made members of
Congress uneasy, frustrated, and even angry.... Signs of internal management
dysfunction at HUD were evident."'
56
One of the critical issues of concern to Congress was HUD's loss of
control over the third parties, especially realtors, coinsurers, and mortgage
lenders, on which delivery of HUD programs depends.' 7 In HUD's case, the
Government (Dec. 12, 1988), in NAT'L ACAD. OF PUBLIC ADMIN., T h SIXTH LECTURE OF THE
JAMES E. WEBB FUND FOR EXCELLENCE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1988).
151. See, e.g., Thomas H. Stanton, Program Design and the Quest for Smaller and More
Efficient Government, in MAKING GOVERNMENT MANAGEABLE (Thomas H. Stanton & Benjamin
Ginsburg eds., forthcoming Jan. 2004) (discussing the impact of downsizing on federal
agencies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
152. U.S. COMM'N ON NAT'L SECURTY/21sT CENTURY, ROAD MAP FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY: IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE 47 (2001), available at http://www.nssg.gov/
PhaselIlFR.pdf.
153. id. at 16.
154. Id. at xiv.
155. See generally NAT'L ACAD. OFPUB. ADMIN., RENEWING HUD: A LoNG-TERM AGENDA
FOR EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE 2 (1994) [hereinafter RENEwING HUD).
156. Id.
157. See id. (describing political embarrassment caused by HUD scandals involving its
private-sector real estate brokers, mortgage lenders, and co-insurers).
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loss of control led to actual scandals." 8 Otherwise, the description of a cycle of
disinvestments, diminished performance, congressional displeasure, and further
diminished performance could have been written about a number of federal
agencies. The panel's description of HUD is remarkable for its applicability to
other parts of government today:
HUD at mid-1993 was an organization bogged down in programs,
regulations, and handbooks, and too distant from its varied communities of
users. Though clear on paper, lines of decision-making had blurred among
field, regions and headquarters. An inflexibly-applied hiring freeze made it
increasingly difficult to manage declining resources as responsibilities
expanded. While struggling staff attempted some innovative ways to meet
these challenges, more often HUD's communities of clients were frustrated
by increasing delays in reaching decisions and a perceived emphasis on
compliance rather than partnerships for solving the nation's housing and
community development problems.
15 9
V. Administering Medicare in the Twenty-First Century.
Where Do We Go from Here?
A. Improving the Management Capability of Government Agencies
and Programs
The events of September 11,2001 have brought into sharp focus the costs
of hollow government and the neglect of the administrative capacity of agencies
to carry out their missions. Many years ago, the EOP included an Office of
Management and Organization (earlier a part of the Administrative
Management Division), housed first in the Bureau of the Budget and then in the
new Office of Management and Budget (OMB), that had responsibility for
enhancing the management and organization of government organizations and
programs. 160 That office had responsibility for enhancing the institutional
capacity of the presidency and, by extension, the rest of the executive branch.' 6'
158. See id. (describing a HUD scandal that led to criminal prosecutions and convictions of
department officials).
159. Id. at 61.
160. See, e.g., EMMETTE S. REDFORD & MARLAN BLISSET, ORGANIZ[NG THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH: THE JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 220-21 (1981) (describing the functions of the Office of
Management and Organization as including the safeguarding of the constitutional position of
the President, maintaining consistency in concepts of organization, and acting as a repository of
knowledge on organization history and issues).
161. Id.
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The OMB today has lost much of its ability to contribute to the
management capacity of government agencies. On July 24, 2001, William
Clinger, formerly Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight, wrote to Vice President Cheney to express his concern about the
consequences for the management capacity of the President:
In my years in Congress I witnessed the erosion of presidential authority,
interest, and capacity in management with dismay .... Major issues, such
as today's concern about the future of Medicare organization and
administration, are being left to the vagaries of subcommittee politics.
When asked how the new Medicare proposals should be organized and
administered, the Executive Office is silent. The truth is that the President
has little in-house capabilities to frame an answer to organizational
management issues. He is forced by the vacuum in management capacity
and knowledge to become a defensive and reactive player. Presidents
nonetheless are going to be held responsible for how well the Medicare
program works (whichever variation is adopted) without having much
ability to shape the administrative issues in advance.1
62
In recent years, the governmental affairs and government reform
committees of both houses have lost much of their traditional capacity to deal
with issues of government organization and management. 63 In his
memorandum to the Vice President, Clinger related the weak management
capacity in OMB to an erosion of the ability of Congress to look at crosscutting
government management issues:
The Government Reform Committee in the House used to be able to act as
the government-wide watchdog in cooperation with the BOB [Bureau of
Budget]/OMB. Personnel issues, for instance, once centralized so that the
parts of the larger system could be coordinated and related to one another,
are increasingly being assigned to departments and agencies that then deal
exclusively with their oversight committees whose perspective is narrow
and definitely not concerned with presidential interests. Thus, the
weakening of the M in OMB has also meant the weakening of their
correspondent committees on the Hill.1
64
The danger of the many urgent proposals in the aftermath of September
11, 2001 is that they seek to upgrade administrative capabilities with respect to
homeland security, but generally leave the rest of the government's programs in
162. Memorandum from William Clinger, former Chairman of the House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, to Richard Cheney, Vice President of the United States 2
(July 24, 2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
163. See id. at 2 (stating that the Government Reform Committee in the House used to act
as the government-wide watchdog in cooperation with the BOB/OMB).
164. Id.
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the same sorry state of neglect that they were in before. A strategic
organization and management capability in the EOP is needed for the entire
executive branch to provide help for agencies and programs across the
government. This capability would help enhance the provision of Medicare
services, and improve the organizational structure for energy programs, federal
housing programs, and other major government commitments that are being
implemented by troubled agencies or departments.
The new office might have the following general responsibilities:
* Government Organization: Review government-wide organizational
structure on a continuing basis, periodically reporting to the president and
Congress on the state of government organization, and submit proposals to
improve the performance and efficiency of federal programs and the
capacity of federal agencies.
* Cooperation and Coordination: Facilitate interagency and intergovernmental
cooperation and assist in developing effective coordinating mechanisms
throughout the government
* Systems Improvement: Provide leadership for improvement ofagencies'
administrative and program delivery systems. Administrative systems
include, for example, personnel, procurement, and information resources.
* Early Warning: Analyze agency capacity and operations, for example,
with respect to national homeland security, public health, or financial
vulnerabilities, to detect potentially damaging gaps and shortcomings.
* Special Organizations: Oversee the overall operations and management
of government corporations, government-sponsored enterprises, quasi-
governmental entities, and other institutions with a governmental interest.
" Reorganization and Management Legislation: Develop criteria and
standards to be met prior to the submission of legislation to establish new,
or reorganize existing, government corporations, enterprises, and other
entities with a government interest; provide advice on the workability of
proposed programs and legislation as they are being developed.
* Fostering Management Analysis Capacity: Help departments and
agencies to develop internal management analysis capabilities. 65
165. Cf. To Establish an Office of Management in the Executive Office of the President:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 106th Cong. 39 (1999) [hereinafter To Establish] (prepared statement of Herbert N.
Jasper, Fellow, Nat'l Acad. of Pub. Admin., former Prof I Mgmt. staff member, Bureau of
Budget) (suggesting possible objectives of a program to improve management); id. at 88
(prepared statement of Ronald C. Moe, Specialist, Gov't Org. & Mgmt., Congressional
Research Serv.) (discussing possible statutory provisions that could address six areas of
management concern).
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The question of location of organizational expertise in the EOP has
been a matter of considerable debate within NAPA.166 On the one hand,
many Academy Fellows who are current or former OMB officials argue
that organization, management, and budget are inseparable. They argue
that the design of programs and agencies must be accomplished with close
attention to the resources that may be required. 167 On the other hand, many
other Academy Fellows argue that a fundamental conflict exists between
the management and budget functions. 168 In their view, the primacy of
budget constraints since the 1980s has meant that the budget function
inevitably dominates over the issues of government effectiveness that the
organization and management function must address.169 They point to a
general neglect of the management function at OMB, especially in the past
few years, and urge that the organization and management function be in a
separate office from OMB. 70 While the budget function requires OMB to
wield power to constrain resources that agencies and programs would like
to have, the organization and management function is more supportive in
nature and calls for the establishment of collaborative working
relationships with agency officials that could be jeopardized by budget
conflicts.
After weighing these considerations, it appears that with appropriate
top-level support, the organization and management function could operate
well within OMB, as it did historically in the BOB. As a practical matter,
166. Compare infra note 167 (arguing for the integration of OMB functions), with infra
notes 168-70 (supporting the separation of OMB functions).
167. See To Establish, supra note 165, at 13 (prepared statement of Edward G. DeSeve,
Acting Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. & Budget) ("OMB's activities are part of a
comprehensive whole-from policy development through program implementation and
evaluation. These important responsibilities should be carried out in an integrated manner, not
through fragmented organization.").
168. See id. at 80 (prepared statement of Ronald C. Moe) (arguing that budgetary and
management values are distinct, as budgetary values have a short-term perspective whereas
management values operate with a long-term perspective).
169. See id. at 42 (prepared statement of Herbert N. Jasper) (discussing several reports that
recommended the separation of OMB's management functions from its budgetary functions);
see also id. at 82 (prepared statement of Ronald C. Moe) (expressing that some scholars believe
that budgetary values and priorities displace management values when they are combined
because management values lack immediate political appeal).
170. See id. at 38 (prepared statement of Herbert N. Jasper) (arguing that the Deputy
Director for Management at OMB cannot effectively carry out both management and budgetary
functions and noting that OMB has ignored management issues in the past); see also id. at 82
(prepared statement of Ronald C. Moe) (expressing that some scholars believe that
governmental activities are essentially "unmanaged" because of the displacement of
management values and priorities by budgetary values and priorities).
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however, and with some notable exceptions, OMB has not been able to
prevent budget considerations from seriously undermining the management
function. Therefore, the office responsible for organization and
management should be a small independent office within the EOP.
Traditionally, the influence of the Division of Management and
Organization of the BOB rested on its support from the President and
organizational knowledge and competence. 7' The effectiveness of such an
office today similarly will depend on: (1) support from the President for its
work; (2) other demands for its services; and (3) the abilities of its
leadership and staff.
If such an office existed today, it would greatly add to the President's
capacity to address the critical issues of organization, management, and
coordination that have become a national priority with respect to assuring
homeland security across all of the agencies and programs of government.
This capacity should strengthen the authority of the congressional
government affairs committees. Expanded authority and capability among
the committees, in turn, is likely to increase the stature of the new office as
well. The need for a solid analysis of executive organization and
management likely will continue to be strong for quite some time.
B. Improving the Administration of Medicare
One issue concerning the future of Medicare administration is where
important economic, demographic, technological, and political external
forces will go in the future. The consequences of economic and
demographic issues for Medicare's administration are hard to predict, but
increasing healthcare costs and an increasing number of eligible Medicare
beneficiaries undoubtedly will lead to major program changes in the future.
Eventually, technology may become easier for CMS to apply to the
administration of claims processing and other systems. CMS faces a
strategic imperative on the technology front-to counter the current
downward spiral in confidence in CMS administration, the agency must
gain control over the information concerning its program so that it can
become accepted, perhaps even respected, as a participant in deliberations
over Medicare's administration and the program's future.
Assuming that fee-for-service coverage remains a part of Medicare,
Gail Wilensky has asked important questions about the politics of Medicare
171. See REDFORD & BLISSET, supra note 160, at 220-23 (describing how the Division of
Management and Organization operated).
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administration: "One question is whether HCFA will be given the power to
administer a modernized fee-for-service program. Will Congress allow
HCFA the flexibility that will be needed to run such a program and will
Congress and the Administration provide HCFA with the resources needed
to carry out such a task."' 72 Wilensky adds, "History is not encouraging on
either of these issues." 173 The voice of beneficiaries on behalf of effective
program administration has been missing from the political debate. Only
the beneficiaries can provide a political counterweight to the other interests
that predominate in making administration of Medicare so difficult.
Academics have not highlighted administration of Medicare as a critical
issue. Academics also have not highlighted the larger policy issues such as
the financing of Medicare and the extent of program coverage.
Will anything actually happen to reverse today's downward spiral of
low confidence and even lower investment in Medicare administration?
The lessons from other federal departments and agencies are mixed. To
take one example, the U.S. Coast Guard languished for years, attempting to
carry out its mission with an obsolescent fleet that was the third oldest of
the forty main naval powers in the world.' 74 Then came September 11,
2001 and a recognition of the importance of the Coast Guard to the well-
being of the United States. This recognition led to the greatest infusion of
funds that the agency has ever seen and the establishment of a seventeen-
billion-dollar program to provide the ships and systems that the agency has
long needed.
17
Given the strong beneficiary constituency of Medicare and the
importance of the program to a large number of people, such a development
for CMS is not out of the question. At least as likely, however, is that the
status quo of continuing decline will prevail in the future. The example of
HUD already has been discussed. The 1994 NAPA report on HUD
contained the following recommendation:
The department should be preserved only if it can demonstrate the
capacity to manage its resources responsibly, and if the administration,
172. Patients First, supra note 43, at 239 (statement of Gail R. Wilensky, John M. Olin
Senior Fellow, Chair of Project Hope, MedPAC).
173. Id.
174. See MICHAEL E. O'HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: ONE
YEAR ON 22-23 (2002) (discussing shortcomings of the United States Coast Guard before
September 11,2001).
175. THOMAS H. STANTON, IBM CENTER FOR THE BUS. OF GOV'T, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL
ASsET MANAGEMENT: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 20-21 (describing the Integrated Deepwater
Procurement Program).
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Congress, and HUD can put aside the past to look toward how the
department can best help communities meet their needs in a flexible
fashion. If, after five years, HUD is not operating under a clear
legislative mandate and in an effective, accountable manner, the
president and Congress should seriously consider dismantling the
department and moving its core programs elsewhere.1
76
It has been many years since the publication of that NAPA report, and
HUD continues to operate without a clear legislative mandate and with
substantial operational shortcomings in major programs.177 Absent the
impact of a calamitous event such as September 11, 2001, administration
would seem to be a neglected issue not only for Medicare, but also across
much of the rest of the government.
176. RFNEWNG HUD, supra note 155, at x.
177. See MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, supra note 114, at 3-4 ("While we recognize HUD's
progress, serious weaknesses remain ..... For example, the single-family mortgage insurance
programs remain a high-risk area because of continued weaknesses in the mortgage insurance
process, evidence of fraud, and the variety of management challenges HUD faces in
implementing corrective actions.").
1413
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1373 (2003)
ADDENDUM
On December 8, 2003, as this Article was in publication, the President
signed into law the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003.' The 700-page bill made numerous changes to the
Medicare program that will require CMS to issue new regulations, provide new
policy guidance, procure new payment of contractor services, studies, and
demonstration projects, and establish a new prescription drug benefit. In its
depth and extent of prescriptive detail, the 2003 legislation resembles earlier
enactments, such as the Medicare-related provisions of the BBA of 1997. The
administrative burden on CMS is likely to increase even more if, as some
expect, Congress follows up this year's law with a large technical corrections
bill next year.
Nonetheless, the new legislation also gives one several grounds for
optimism that Congress did not neglect administration of Medicare this time
around. First, the new law allocates close to $1 billion over two years-2004
and 2005-to pay for costs of implementation, including new hires, added
contractors, and new systems. CMS is said to be scrambling to find qualified
people to hire for the Medicare Advantage program and other implementation
tasks.2
Second, the 2003 legislation includes a reform that policy advocates have
sought for many years-a reform of the relationship of CMS to its payments
contractors. The law eliminates the distinction between Part A contractors
(carriers) and Part B contractors (fiscal intermediaries) and merges the authority
for both types of entity into a new category called a "Medicare Administrative
Contractor" (MAC). The Secretary of HHS is authorized to contract
competitively with the new MACs, and to renew the contracts annually for up
to five years. All contracts must be competed for at least every five years using
the competitive process. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) apply to
MAC contracts except to the extent they conflict with a specific Medicare
requirement. The law does not extend FAR requirements to other contractors
under Title XVIII. The law requires the Secretary to establish contract
I. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, available at http://www.westlaw.com.
2. See Steve Teske, Medicare: CMS Faces Massive Task of Implementing New Drug
Bill as Administrator Scully Leaves, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, No. 233, Dec. 4,
2003, at A13 (stating that the agency needs to find qualified staff and contractors to do the
work, and that "[t]he availability of personnel remains an open question among many familiar
with the workings of the industry and the health care community") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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performance requirements and to develop standards for measuring the extent to
which a contractor has met the requirements.3
Third, the law is notable for what it did not do. The House bill would
have established a new Medicare Benefits Administration, including a
Medicare Policy Advisory Board, within HHS but separate from CMS, to
administer parts of the Medicare program other than Parts A and B. The Senate
bill would have established a new Center for Medicare Choices within HHS but
separate from CMS, to administer parts of the Medicare program other than
Parts A and B. Either of these proposals would have greatly complicated
Medicare administration by fragmenting responsibilities into distinct
organizations that would have been potential competitors, while depending on
one another for coordination of the provision of Medicare services.
The final law instead created a center within CMS to administer Parts C
and D of Medicare, provide notice and information to beneficiaries, and carry
out other duties that the HHS Secretary may specify. The head of the new
center reports directly to the administrator of CMS. 4 This organizational
solution is far superior to trying to fragment Medicare services across separate
units within HHS.
Despite these positive developments in the new legislation, most of the
aspects of neglect of Medicare administration remain. CMS continues to lack
adequate resources, in funding as well as people. While the substantial new
funding resources provided to CMS for the years 2004-2005 will help to
compensate for some of the costs of implementing the new law and drug
benefit program, CMS Administrator Tom Scully is reported to have said that
Medicare may need more money for implementation in later years.5 Moreover,
there has been a significant turnover in senior executives at CMS over the past
several years, which would seem to imply the kind of loss of experience and
institutional memory that HCFA officials forecasted in the 1990s.
6
The new law does provide some flexibility in personnel rules so that CMS
can add new staff for the new center that will administer Medicare Parts C and
D.' This flexibility, however, does not extend to the parts of CMS that
3. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 § 911.
4. Id. § 900.
5. See Teske, supra note 2 ("More money for implementation may be needed in the
future, but Scully said he doubted the agency could implement the bill faster with more
funding.").
6. In December 2000, CMS had forty-four employees in the Senior Executive Service;
twenty-two of them have left as of this writing, three years later. E-mail from Sharon Appleby,
Deputy Group Director, Human Resources Management Group, CMS, to Thomas Stanton (Dec.
9, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 § 900.
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administer Medicare Parts A and B. The new law also did not improve the
issue of accountability in the form of micromanagement. The law requires
CMS to implement numerous specific provisions by specific dates. Given the
public attention focused on the new prescription drug benefit, CMS will be
under significant pressure to start the program within the very tight timetable
that the legislation sets. On balance, then, administration continues to be a
neglected issue for Medicare, despite some promising features in the new law.
